Using a national loan level data set we examine loan default as explained by local demographic characteristics and state level legislation that regulates foreclosure procedures and predatory lending through a hierarchical linear model. We observe significant variation in the default rate across states, with lower default levels in states with higher temporal and financial costs to lenders when controlling for loan and local conditions. The results are notable given that many of the observed loans were sold to investors in national and international markets. State level legislative influences provide a foundation for discussion of national level policy that further regulates predatory lending and financial institution foreclosure activities.
Introduction
Residential mortgage default is a complex event triggered by a host of household and socio-economic events. The recent collapse of the subprime market, coupled with the imposing downturn in the housing and broader economic markets has resulted in a rapidly expanding rate of mortgage defaults, many of which end in foreclosure and REO. 1 We know from previous literature that there are trigger events, underwriting issues, economic factors, and interest rate changes that impact the probability and timing of default (Quercia, Stegman and Davis 2005; Renuart, 2004; Vandell, 1995; Van Order, 1984, 1985) . We further recognize that variations in state level legislation regulating predatory lending and foreclosure proceedings exist, and that both legislative directives impose varying costs and benefits that affect the value of a mortgage to the lender and borrower. We have only limited information, however, on the impact of such legislation on the propensity of a default event and the ultimate foreclosure or REO from the lender's perspective (Ambrose and Buttimer, 2000; Capozza and Thomson, 2005, 2006; Crews-Cutts and Merrill, 2008 ).
We do not argue that the optimal foreclosure rate is zero. While lenders, of course, predicate their loans on the probability of repayment, those lenders who would seek only to minimize either the number of bad loans, or the volume of dollars foregone due to foreclosure, would clearly forego potentially substantial profits. Still mass foreclosures can have deleterious neighborhood and national impacts, as has become apparent in the United States since 2007.
Policies that would reduce the numbers of foreclosures, and their external impacts, would be warmly greeted by mortgage lenders and borrowers alike.
The literature on foreclosures generally asserts that, except for workout efforts on the part of the lender, the ultimate decision to default rests with the borrower. Although we do not challenge this proposition, we do posit that the legislative costs imposed on financial institutions create an incentive for credit rationing by lenders. Underwriting is the lender's instrument in risk reduction. State policies that impose costs to financial institutions for high-cost (often categorized as predatory) lending and foreclosure processing are designed to motivate restraint on lenders. By instituting higher underwriting standards, financial institutions attempt to reduce potential costs to the overall loan portfolio. This would suggest that restrictive lending policies simply result in lenders imposing greater restraint in granting loans via the underwriting mechanism -a form of credit rationing. Lenders will attempt to mitigate the higher cost of instituting foreclosure in states that impose more stringent legislation by 1) increasing the borrowers' cost of funds (Pence, 2006) and 2) instituting differential underwriting standards with more rigid benchmarks applied to borrowers in high-cost states. We expect to observe this in a lower default rate for those high-cost states as a result of the higher acceptance threshold.
Utilizing a dataset of over 20 million loans aggregated at the zip code level, we attempt to determine the political and locational drivers of default. We rely on state level variations in the foreclosure timeline and estimated cost as identified in Crews-Cutts and Merrill (2008) as a proxies for the costs of default to the lender. We also include variables from the predatory lending literature to test their relationship to the default rate (Bostic, et al, 2007) . The zip code loan data and the state level variables are supplemented with static and dynamic demographic information to control for economic variations and location fixed effects.
In the next section, we outline the well developed literature on state legislation governing predatory lending and foreclosure proceedings. We rely on the literature to establish the model for the underwriting role in reducing cost in the setup to the analysis. We follow with the modeling approach to the analysis and the data, along with a discussion of the results. The paper Housing Foreclosures: Theory Works, and So Does Policy 4 concludes with a summary and discussion of the implications for state policy.
State Legislation

Predatory Lending Laws
One of the first legislative acts directly addressing predatory mortgage lending was the Federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA) (Pub. L. 103-325, 108
Stat. 21600). 2 HOEPA defined a class of mortgage loans that can be classified as -high-cost‖ if the APR on the loans exceeded the yield on a then-current Treasury Security, having a comparable maturity, by 8 percentage points. 3 In the late 1990s, many states adopted legislation designed to reduce predatory lending. Some of these state laws are patterned on older laws that pre-dated HOEPA (An and Bostic, 2008) while North Carolina was the first state to adopt a true state -mini-HOEPA‖ law in 1999. 4 The effect of these statutes is a matter of debate, and prior research provides support for both supporters and critics.
Supporters of these statutes argue that regulation is needed, both to allay consumer fears about dishonest lenders and to ensure that creditors internalize the cost of any negative externalities resulting from predatory loans (for an overview of predatory lending from marketing to securitization see Renuart, 2004) . In a study on credit flows in North Carolina (Inside B&C Lending, 2001) , lenders still offered a full menu of loan products with little or no effect on loan prices. Elliehausen and Staten (2004) find that the volume of subprime mortgages originated in North Carolina relative to the control states dropped for North Carolina borrowers with annual household incomes of $50,000 or less, but rose for higher-income borrowers in that state (Bostic, et al., 2007) . Ernst, Farris and Stein (2002) Critics charge that anti-predatory lending statutes reduce the availability of credit to borrowers who previously were credit constrained, including lower-income households and minorities, by rationing credit and increasing the price of subprime loans. Ho and PenningtonCross (2006a) find that the presence of a predatory lending law alone has little impact on loan originations, while applications and rejection rates generally decline. The punitive severity of the legislation, however, appears relevant as more aggressive legislation is correlated with a decline in originations by subprime lenders. These changes appear to occur because of changes in marketing and are consistent with subprime lenders' avoidance of loans made to higher risk borrowers that are covered under state predatory mortgage laws. In a follow up study, Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006b) used the same legal index and border area methodology to examine the effect of state anti-predatory lending laws on the cost of credit. They discover that subprime loans originated in states with anti-predatory lending legislation have lower APRs than loans in unregulated states. They also observe that increasing the strength of a law increases the deviation in the APR. A study by Ernst, Farris and Stein (2002) (Bostic, et al., 2007) .
Two additional studies considered whether the reduction in North Carolina subprime loans, post-law, was due to supply-side or demand-side effects. Reports by Burnett, Finkel and Kaul (2004) , and Harvey and Nigro (2004) find that loan originations fell due to relative reductions in application volumes, but the probability of subprime loan denials held constant.
They attributed the reduction in North Carolina originations to reduced demand, not to supply.
Another line of research sought to explain subprime performance as a function of the factors that are used to categorize mortgage lending practices as predatory. For example, Quercia, Stegman, and Davis (2005) find that two risk factors, balloon payments and prepayment penalties, increase mortgage foreclosure risk 20 to 50 percent on refinance loans. Rose (2008) , however, finds that the impacts of the examined loan features on the probability of foreclosure vary significantly across subprime refinances and home purchase mortgages. Alexander et al. (2002) finds the risk of default to be higher for loans originated by a third party, such as a mortgage broker. The number of mortgage brokers has expanded in recent years, and the Office of Thrift Supervision has noted that mortgage brokers originate up to 80 percent of risky, subprime loans. A study by Harvey (2003) of HMDA data in Chicago seeks to ascertain the effect of anti-predatory lending ordinances adopted by Chicago. have stronger anti-predatory lending laws. The authors assert this relationship suggests some portion of borrowers that apply for a -high-cost‖ loan possess higher than anticipated credit quality. This is consistent with the view that predatory lending laws have adversely affected access to credit for marginal borrowers who would be served by the subprime lending market.
Provisions of anti-predatory lending laws also seem to matter, as the observed overall patterns (higher applications and originations, lower denial rates) are stronger with language providing wider coverage, greater restrictions, and stronger enforcement mechanisms. Consider Figure 1 where the current status of loans in default is compared against that of states with and without HOEPA like legislation. 
Foreclosure Laws
It is clear that lenders face differential loan default costs based on state legislation. For example, some control over default losses is afforded to lenders through the workout process and the use of deficiency judgments where available (Ambrose and Buttimer, 2000) . In states that provide deficiency judgment the lender receives the house plus any deficiency judgment, collections, and the borrower receives the benefit of eliminating negative equity less any deficiency judgment. In 21 states, judicial foreclosure requires lenders to go through the court system to foreclose on property. Judicial foreclosure proceedings restrict lenders or trustees in their disposition of the property (Edmiston and Zalneraitis, 2007) resulting in a foreclosure process that takes, on average, five months longer than the nonjudicial alternative (Wood, 1997) and imposes more transaction costs.
Several studies have verified that the judicial requirement can significantly raise lender foreclosure costs, perhaps by as much as 10 percent of the loan balance (Ghent and Kudlyak, 2009 Foreclosure costs can also vary according to the type of redemption allowed (statutory or equitable), and whether the state allows deficiency judgments. Statutory redemption refers to the period of time after a foreclosure sale during which the borrower has the right to redeem the property by paying the principal balance, accrued interest, any penalties or fees, and court costs (Clauretie and Herzog, 1990) . Deficiency judgments allow the lender to attempt to recover funds that remain unpaid after the foreclosure sale. The availability of deficiency judgments has the opposite effect on default rates as foreclosure relief, such as redemption (Kahn and Yavas, 1994) . Crews-Cutts and Merrill (2008) observe that the probability of successful reinstatement of defaulted loans can be reduced by 3 to 9 percentage points by shortening state statutory timelines to match the national median timeline. Pennington-Cross (2003) finds that houses in judicial foreclosure states sell for 4 percent less than those in statutory foreclosure states, presumably due to greater depreciation during the longer foreclosure process.
Clauretie ( 1989) and Clauretie and Herzog (1990) look at losses to primary mortgage insurance companies in the 1980s. They conclude that because a judicial procedure and a statutory right of redemption lengthens the foreclosure process and delays the liquidation of the property, losses are greater in states that require the former and grant the latter.
Regardless of the extent of underwriting and information gathering that typically occurs in the qualification of borrowers at origination, lenders still have limited ability to control the borrower's decision to default (Ambrose and Buttimer, 2000) . For example, trigger events and house price volatility are virtually impossible to foresee. Further, most mortgage pricing models rely on the interaction of interest rates and property values post origination to determine the probability of borrower default (Kau and Kim, 1994; Kau, Keenan and Kim, 1993; Foster and Van Order, 1984) . 8 The objective of the underwriting process is to minimize those costs subject to information constraints regarding the borrower and future events with the profit incentive as guidance in the decision process. It is assumed that applying for a loan is costly, so that individuals will only do so if their chance of being approved is sufficiently high (Longhofer and Peters, 2005) . Borrowers decide whether to apply for a loan given their creditworthiness, and assets (the houses) are fixed in location. It is this location variation (across states) that exposes all borrowers within a state to similar levels of discrimination, as borrowers select lenders naively.
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Consider the case in which there are pools of applicants residing in two states; one is a low cost state for default and the other is a high cost state, with costs representing lender costs if the borrower defaults. The borrowers are applying for loans with a single financial institution that services both states. The state with lower cost of default provide incentive to lenders to institute more liberal underwriting practices than for similar loans in the high cost state. Given the borrower's inability to self-select, borrowers from the two states will face different requirements.
From this set of conditions, we formulate the following hypotheses. This is particularly relevant to the period of observation (August, 2008) given the overall downward trend in the housing market. Financial institutions that proceed from foreclosure to REO incur extensive transaction and holding costs in acquiring and disposing of foreclosed properties given the time that they are on market is increasing and property values are decreasing at the end of the analysis period. In the analysis that follows we incorporate legislative controls for both predatory lending and foreclosure execution in order to gauge the impact they have on the extent of default.
Analysis
Establishing the models
Our analysis uses a database comprised of individual loan performance data aggregated by zip code. Default and foreclosure might be considered as an issue of either -place‖ or -people‖ problems. In this paper, we concentrate on place. Housing markets have multiple geographic aspects, including neighborhood externalities, municipal tax base impacts, and real estate markets. Large parts of urban areas have been adversely affected by large-scale default and foreclosure, and as such location is an important policy issue in regulating foreclosure. 10 We assume that each observation has a set of unknown factors that contribute to an individual's mortgage selection and includes characteristics of the mortgages that make up the 12 subsamples for each zip code. The observations include both dynamic data (the number of loans in various states of default, the number of loans with prepayment penalties, and the number of loans in foreclosure); and static data (loan to value ratio, original FICO and original purchase price). To compare zip codes we convert count variables into percentages. Mean level data includes the average age of the loans, the average remaining balance, and the interest rates charged. Foreclosure rates are assumed to be given in the independent standard forms as follows:
where y is the percent of loans in foreclosure and/or REO observed for each zip code and X is a vector of explanatory variables including loan attributes. The disturbance  represents those unobservable characteristics of the pool of zip-code level loans that affect the foreclosure rate, and the errors are assumed to follow a normal distribution with zero mean and variance     Additionally, we know that the distribution of loan types is subject to conditions endogenous to the neighborhood such as geographic targeting by mortgage venders, variations that underwriting place on borrower credibility by neighborhood, and the borrower's selection process in purchasing a mortgage product (Pavlov and Wachter, 2006) . The borrower's selection can be influenced by information asymmetries that limit the choice set, perceived variations in transaction costs, and motivations for borrowing. Furthermore, given that households-either consciously or through socioeconomic mechanisms-sort themselves into neighborhoods comprised of households with similar characteristics, it is reasonable to expect that neighborhood composition plays a formidable role in determining the loan products offered and acquired by borrowers and consequently the inevitable probability of foreclosure (Phillips and VanderHoff, 2004) . We control for the characteristics of the neighborhood by including zip code level census data.
Zip code location variables do not address all the unobserved biases embedded in the economic conditions of the local market. For this reason we include both dynamic and static data at the metropolitan level. Finally, the models include state level proxies for foreclosure and predatory lending legislation to respond to our hypothesis that higher lender costs (both fiscal and temporal) result in tighter underwriting, thereby reducing default rates.
HLR Modeling
Our analysis is based on zip-code level observations that occur within MSAs and within particular states. For example, New York City and Buffalo are subject to the same state regulations, but are located almost 400 miles apart, and are subject to different MSA-level housing market conditions. Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas share a common border, but lie in different states. Both MSA and state level variables matter.
While metropolitan or state level indicators can be included in an ad hoc manner, depending on the problem, it is useful to borrow an analytical framework from the education, evaluation, and health care literatures. School researchers have long recognized that students learn within groups, within classrooms, within grades, within schools, and within school districts. The achievement of students within a particular classroom may be related to the specific teacher, which may be related to attitudes or supervision at the particular school. Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) provide detailed explanation of the method, and Goodman and Thibodeau (1998) apply it to housing markets and submarkets.
We begin our analysis with a baseline set of ordinary least squares regressions to serve as a point of comparison and demarcation. Start with model
f subscripts refer to foreclosure variables y f = appropriate foreclosure indicator x f = variables subject to HLM z f = variables not subject to HLM ε f = error term.
An OLS formulation implicitly assumes that the relationships are constant either across metropolitan areas or across states and that the error variances are also constant. Then, write coefficients:
where ε′ a are the error terms in the constant substitutions and ε′ b are the error terms in the slope substitutions.
Substituting [3] and [4] into [2],
where 
where a   are the error terms in the constant substitutions and b   are the error terms in the slope substitutions.
where . To test for externalities that influence the length and cost of the foreclosure process, we consider variations in state regulations on the foreclosure filings by financial institutions. Each state has unique legislation restricting the foreclosure proceeding, and this variation has implications for the rate at which properties progress into foreclosure. The proxies used in this case come from the Freddie Mac analysis of expected optimal statutory timeline for foreclosure presented by Crews-Cutts and Merrill (2008) . From foreclosure referral through the title work, the foreclosure sale and, where applicable, the redemption period, the authors present expected total and actual average days from -due date of the last paid installment‖ to disposition. 13 Using Freddie Mac's experience with lenders, the average actual time across all states between the due date of the last paid mortgage installment and the foreclosure sale is nearly a year (355 days). refer to as pre-predatory laws and mini-HOEPA laws, and their analysis, provide evidence that newer mini-HOEPA laws influenced the subprime market above and beyond the older preexisting laws, particularly for subprime originations. We construct dichotomous variables representing those states that do (coded 1) and do not (coded 0) possess either of these two market regulations. 14 After cleaning and filtering the loan data we are left with a dataset that includes 11,950 zip codes created from a cross sectional dataset of over 23 million individual loan records. Table 1 presents the overall summary statistics by zip code with variable definitions.
Table 1 Approximately Here
At the time the data were gathered, the mean interest rate charged by zip code ranged 
Discussion of Results
We present our findings in a sequential manner to discuss the general modeling approach (OLS and HLR) in Table 2 , and then expand it to look at state level effects in foreclosure -column a, REO -column b, and, both foreclosure and REO -column c, the sum of columns a and b.
We test this combined dependent variable given the cross sectional nature of our data and the fact that both foreclosure and REO represent default in different states in the process. is generally an average of the two elasticities.
Metro Level Analysis
Consider the results of the OLS models for the interest rate and FICO scores as indicators of foreclosure probabilities. For ease of interpretation the results are converted to elasticities, which are large and significant. For column (a), the foreclosure percentage, the elasticity with respect to the interest rate is +7.35, and the elasticity with respect to the FICO score is -4.12. For column (b), the interest rate elasticity is +14.97, and the FICO elasticity is -1.20. Although there is no theoretical foundation for the sizes of the elasticities, the signs are intuitive. 16 High interest rates are related to large numbers of foreclosures; high FICO scores prevent them. Other loan characteristics included in the models also appear to have the anticipated signs and connection to default.
Anomalies in the OLS models, however, suggest that OLS is limited in its ability to explain the variations in the dependent variables. For example, the lack of significance at any level for the variable median household income is also interesting. This is an estimate of the real rates, lax underwriting, predatory lending, fraud, lack of borrower due diligence, and underlying economic factors in some regions-combined to create an environment in which some homeowners found themselves in negative equity positions, while other homeowners were trapped in loans they could not afford to keep current or refinance. Many of these borrowers acquired their homes with unconventional mortgage loans. While we reiterate that a zero default rate is not necessarily desirable, the unprecedented high rates (at least since the 1930s) almost certainly would have been reduced by closer attention to  the types of loans made available (interest rates and interest terms),  borrower characteristics (particularly FICO scores),
 the profit incentive of the mortgage lenders as it affects access to credit, and  appropriate state legislation that regulates mortgage products
Opponents of increased regulation of the subprime market may argue that amplified restrictions will result in higher costs and reduced access to credit for many borrowers. Immergluck and Smith (2005) argue that the social costs of foreclosure outweigh lower borrowing costs. Foreclosures may have spillover effects in terms of value loss, tax base erosion, instability in retirement wealth for middle income households, and ultimately the economic stability of local communities. The results from this analysis suggest that state level legislation is linked to the rate of default and provides a foundation for discussion of a national level policy that might regulate predatory lending and financial institution foreclosure activities. This is one of many proposed directives for addressing the current (2009-2010) mortgage challenges and future borrower lender interaction during potential default. The elasticity of foreclosures is influenced by those factors illustrated in prior literature to be important in explaining the probability of default as well as the timing of loan origination and the legislative variables of interest.
The results presented in this analysis suggest that higher lender costs for foreclosure and stringent controls on predatory lending are connected to lower foreclosure rates. As we noted earlier, high interest rates are related to large numbers of foreclosures; high FICO scores prevent them. A lack of servicing incentives further exacerbates the probability of foreclosure of troubled loans, and such incentives can be built into the origination process (Cordell, et al., 2008) . Caution is warranted in interpreting these results. As Crews-Cutts and Merrill (2008) point out, longer foreclosure timelines alter the cost/benefit relationship for the borrower's decision to default by creating opportunities for borrowers to occupy the house free of rent during the foreclosure process. Alternatively, states with short timelines to foreclosure reduce the incentive for lenders to conduct workouts in an attempt to cure loans and reduce costs.
The analysis supports the argument that in order to more fully understand the progression to default results adequately, it is necessary to recognize that local household composition, regional economics, and state regulations on lending and the foreclosure process imposed at origination of the loan must be considered. Further, as the HLM models indicate, there is merit to recognizing the hierarchical relationships between state policy and local market outcomes. 14 There is overlap for twelve states where both laws are present and 13 states with neither forms of legislation at the time of this analysis. The recent trauma in the residential market has created incentives for many new recent legislative acts designed to similarly restrict lending activities. 15 We use the reported FICO score in our analysis because it is a naïve value; scaling issues limit a reasonable alternative. The mean and minimum FICO scores have fallen for the sample between origination and the last observation. 16 One might conjecture that these are changes over a small base. However, the variable values have natural meaning, and although the base rates are in fractions of a percent, of the 11, 950 observations for the loan foreclosure variable, only 396, or 3.3 percent, have values of zero. We find that 6,097 zip codes (50.9 percent) have rates greater than 0 but less than 0.1 percent and another 3,094 (25.8 percent) have rates greater than 0.1 percent, but less than 0.2 percent. Using the median rate of 0.0092 as the reference value, rather than the mean of 0.0140, the calculated elasticity is even higher.
